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THE MENS REA OF THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION 
NOAH WEISBORD∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This gathering is steeped in history. It is the hundredth birthday of 
Whitney Harris, one of the last original prosecutors of the Nazi leaders 
after World War II. We’re commemorating Harris’ remarkable life at the 
2012 International Criminal Court at Ten Conference at the Whitney 
Harris World Law Institute at Washington University Law School. Under 
the leadership of Professor Leila Sadat, the Institute has played a 
formative role in the contemporary international justice project. The St. 
Louis conference also celebrates the tenth anniversary of the International 
Criminal Court, which has become an important feature in international 
affairs since its birth in 2002. The ICC is perhaps the most concrete 
expression of the Nuremberg legacy. Two years ago, against most 
expectations, the Assembly of States Parties agreed to incorporate the 
definition and jurisdictional conditions of the crime of aggression into the 
Rome Statute, thereby reviving the fourth and final Nuremberg crime.1  
In a very real sense, the future is contained in the past. ICC Judge 
Hans-Peter Kaul, in his St. Louis lecture memorializing his friend Whitney 
Harris, described how Harris crossed the raucous hall2 at the adoption of 
the Rome Statute in 1998 to shake his hand and solemnly congratulate 
him. Without Germany’s initiative, “the crime of aggression would not 
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 1. The Crime of Aggression, Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, R.C. Res. 6 (June 11, 2010) [hereinafter Kampala Outcome]. 
 2. Hans-Peter Kaul, Judge, Int’l Crim. Ct., Lecture in Honor of Whitney R. Harris Former 
Nuremberg Prosecutor at The International Criminal Court at Ten Conference: The Nuremburg 
Legacy and the International Criminal Court, at 3 (Nov. 11, 2012). Judge Kaul stated: 
After the decisive vote on the Rome Statute, our founding treaty, there is some kind of 
explosion, an enormous outpouring of emotions, of relief among those present, unparalleled 
for such a conference: screams, stamping, exultation without end, tears of joy and relief; hard-
baked delegates and journalists who have frowningly watched the entire conference hug each 
other in a state of euphoria. 
Id. 
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have been included in the treaty.”3 Though the crime of aggression almost 
collapsed the negotiations, Harris considered it essential.4 In an eleventh 
hour compromise, jurisdiction over the crime of aggression was included 
in the Rome Statute, but the crime’s definition and jurisdictional 
conditions were left to be established later.5 It took twelve more years of 
intricate negotiations to build a consensus on the definition and 
jurisdiction of the crime.6 Kaul, head of the German diplomatic delegation 
in Rome and a stalwart proponent of criminalizing aggression, later 
became an ICC Judge and Vice President of the Court. He concluded his 
lecture in St. Louis speaking directly to his departed friend: “Whitney . . . 
[y]ou have shown us that power built on contempt of international law and 
aggression will not stand—we continue to hear you.”7  
It’s likely that the crime of aggression will be reactivated in 2017 or 
soon after.8 I’ve been asked to contribute to the conference and this special 
symposium issue of the Washington University Global Studies Law 
Review by imagining future directions of the Court. Certainly, with 2017 
rapidly approaching, the time for vigorous imagination is upon us. The 
Review Conference in Kampala gave us the bare skeleton of a crime and 
left a great deal to the imagination. The subject of my contribution, in 
honor of Whitney Harris, will be the mens rea of the crime of aggression. 
As all criminal lawyers know, when it comes to substantive crimes, mens 
rea issues are pivotal in determining responsibility and punishment. Mens 
rea is, after all, a “safeguard for beliefs firmly embedded ‘within . . . [the 
criminal law’s] traditions of individual liberty, responsibility and duty.’”9 
 
 
 3. Id. at 4. 
 4. Id. at 3. 
 5. Noah Weisbord, Prosecuting Aggression, 49 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 161, 162 (2008).  
 6. See Stefan Barriga, Negotiating the Amendments on the Crime of Aggression, in CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 3, 5 (Stefan 
Barriga & Claus Kreß eds., 2012) (discussing the negotiations from 1998 to 2010). 
 7. Kaul, supra note 2, at 16. 
 8. See David Scheffer, Adoption of the Amendments on Aggression to the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. BLOG (June 13, 2010, 11:14 AM), http:// 
iccreview.asil.org/?p=174 (remarking that he “would be surprised if, by January 1, 2017, the 30-State 
Party requirement will not have been met”); Hans-Peter Kaul, Is It Possible to Prevent or Punish 
Future Aggressive War-Making?, FORUM FOR INT’L CRIM. & HUMAN. L. 1, 2 (2011) (“There is little 
doubt that this treaty, the Rome Statute, will soon have an article 8bis and articles 15bis and 15ter 
incorporating the crime of aggression.”); William A. Schabas, An Assessment of Kampala: The Final 
Blog, THE ICC REVIEW CONFERENCE: KAMPALA 2010 (June 17, 2010, 10:09 AM), http://iccreview 
conference.blogspot.com/2010/06/assessment-of-kampala-final-blog.html (“Although the amendment 
requires thirty ratifications and a positive decision by the States parties, this should not pose a serious 
problem, and both conditions should be fulfilled by 1 January 2017 or shortly thereafter.”).  
 9. Kelly A. Swanson, Criminal Law: Mens Rea Alive and Well: Limiting Public Welfare 
Offenses—In Re C.R.M., 28 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1265, 1267 (2002) (quoting U.S. v. Cordoba-
Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1993)). 
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Today, most people deem a defendant who lacks a culpable mental state 
unworthy of punishment.10 
The starting point for this exploration of the mens rea of the crime of 
aggression is its elements.11 The elements are an official ICC document 
clarifying the culpable mental state that applies to each aspect of the 
conduct, consequences, and circumstances constituting the crime.12 They 
are meant to “assist the Court in the interpretation and application” of the 
Rome Statute.13 According to Professor Roger Clark, the elements have 
been “central to the way the Chambers have been going about their 
tasks.”14  
Fortunately, I won’t be the first scholar to brave the elements. The first, 
and still the most intrepid, was Clark himself. As a diplomatic 
representative for Samoa, he played a leading role in the drafting of the 
elements. Clark later wrote a paper in 2001 about this exercise—he called 
it an anthropology of treaty-making—which also amounted to an 
elaboration on the work of the Preparatory Commission.15 His 2008 
article, published in the New Zealand Yearbook of International Law, 
examines the way the elements of crimes were employed by the judges in 
the early jurisprudence of the ICC.16 In an article published just before the 
ICC Review Conference, Clark writes about negotiating the elements of 
the fledgling crime of aggression.17 This 2009 paper includes a revealing, 
if brief, discussion of the mens rea of the crime.18  
Two other sources are foundational to this analysis of the mens rea of 
the crime of aggression. In April 2009, as the work of the Special Working 
Group on the Crime of Aggression (“SWGCA”) was wrapping up, a small 
cadre of legal experts and diplomats was invited to an informal retreat in 
 
 
 10. See Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1308 (2011) 
(discussing how punishments are applied to crimes with varying mental states). 
 11. See generally Kampala Outcome, supra note 1. 
 12. See Elements of Crimes: General Introduction, INT’L CRIM. CT., http://www2.icc-cpi.int/ 
NR/rdonlyres/9CAEE830-38CF-41D6-AB0B-68E5F9082543/0/Element_of_Crimes_English.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2013). 
 13. Id. ¶ 1. 
 14. Though the Pre-Trial Chamber I has, at least in Clark’s view, also departed from the structure 
of the Statute and Elements in important ways. See Roger S. Clark, Elements of Crimes in Early 
Confirmation Decisions of Pre-Trial Chambers of the International Criminal Court, 6 N.Z. Y.B. INT’L 
L. 209, 210 (2008). 
 15. Roger S. Clark, The Mental Element in International Criminal Law: The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court and the Elements of Offences, 12 CRIM. L. F. 291, 292 (2001). 
 16. Clark, supra note 14, at 210. 
 17. Roger S. Clark, Negotiating Provisions Defining the Crime of Aggression, its Elements and 
the Conditions for ICC Exercise of Jurisdiction Over It, 20 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1103 (2009).  
 18. Id. at 1111–13. 
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Montreux by the Swiss Department of Foreign Affairs to draft the 
elements of the crime of aggression. Frances Angaddi, Greg French, and 
James Potter, legal experts and diplomatic representatives from Australia, 
contributed a chapter to the Crime of Aggression Library about this 
meeting.19 SWGCA Chair Christian Wenaweser and his team then based 
their 2009 Chairman’s Non-paper on the Elements of Crimes, the other 
foundational source, on the work of the Montreux group.20 With only 
minor changes, the elements of the crime of aggression conceptualized in 
Montreux became the official elements adopted alongside the definition 
and jurisdictional conditions of the crime at the 2010 Review Conference 
in Kampala.21 The work of Clark, Anggadi et al., and Chairman 
Wenaweser are, therefore, my starting point. 
II. BRAVING THE ELEMENTS 
Articles 30 and 32 of the Rome Statute are part of the so-called 
“general” part and, therefore, apply to all ICC crimes,22 including the 
newly defined crime of aggression. Article 30 pertains to the mental 
elements of the ICC crimes as distinguished from the material elements. 
The material element is equivalent to the actus reus in the common law, 
and the mental element serves the function of the mens rea.23 Article 32 
deals with mistakes of fact and law and is, therefore, also relevant when 
establishing the mental element of the crime of aggression because these 
defenses can negate the necessary mental element.24  
The material elements of ICC crimes can be broken down into conduct, 
consequences, and circumstances. These three terms are not defined in the 
Statute.25 Clark, careful not to speak for the drafters, defines conduct as an 
act or omission.26 Consequences, as Clark defines them, are the results of 
 
 
 19. Frances Anggadi, Greg French & James Potter, Negotiating the Elements of the Crime of 
Aggression, in CRIME OF AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION 58, 58 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kreß eds., 2012). 
 20. 2009 Montreux Draft Elements of Crimes, in CRIME OF AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE 
TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 669, 669 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kreß 
eds., 2012).  
 21. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 64. 
 22. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 30, 32, July 1, 2002, 21 U.N.T.S. 90 
[hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 23. Kari M. Fletcher, Defining the Crime of Aggression: Is There an Answer to the International 
Criminal Court’s Dilemma?, 65 A.F.L. REV. 229, 258–59 (2010) (discussing the mental and material 
elements of the crime of aggression using common law terminology of mens rea and actus reus). 
 24. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 32. 
 25. Clark, supra note 15, at 306. 
 26. Id. 
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an act or omission.27 Overlap between these terms, and confusion, occurs 
for people who take conduct to include causation and results.28 The term 
“circumstances” is the most difficult of the three aspects of the material 
element of the crime to define. Clark points out that the problem of 
defining “circumstances,” or “attendant circumstances,” is not unique to 
the Rome Statute.29 Legal scholars and the drafters of the Model Penal 
Code in the United States have also wrestled with the distinction between 
conduct and circumstances.30 Clark takes some comfort in the fact that we 
know a circumstance when we see it: “If I kill a living being, it is only 
murder if the being is a human one.”31 This imperfect breakdown of the 
material element is nonetheless important—it becomes the basis for the 
mental element, or mens rea, of every ICC crime.  
There are only two culpable mental states in the Rome Statute: intent 
and knowledge.32 There is no mention in the statute of recklessness or 
negligence. The mental states of intent and knowledge apply in different 
ways to the material elements of conduct, consequences, and 
circumstances. For the conduct element of a crime, the defendant has the 
culpable mental state if he or she “means [i.e., intends] to engage in the 
conduct.”33 For the consequence element, the defendant has the culpable 
mental state if he or she “means to cause that consequence or is aware 
[knows] that it will occur in the ordinary course of events.”34 The culpable 
mental state for the circumstance element is also knowledge. A defendant 
who knows that a required circumstance exists, such as the existence of an 
armed conflict for war crimes, has the culpable mental state for this 
material element of the crime.35 
The elements of the crime of aggression, as contained in the Kampala 
Outcome (Annex II) are reproduced below: 
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of 
aggression. 
 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id.; see generally American Law Institute, Model Penal Code (1962). 
 31. Clark, supra note 15, at 306. 
 32. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 30; Elements of Crimes, supra note 12, ¶ 2. 
 33. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 30(2)(a). 
 34. Id. art. 30(2)(b). 
 35. Id. art. 30(3). 
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2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of 
the State which committed the act of aggression. 
3. The act of aggression— the use of armed force by a State 
against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 
with the Charter of the United Nations—was committed. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established that such a use of armed force was inconsistent with the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, 
constituted a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations. 
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that 
established such a manifest violation of the Charter of the United 
Nations.36 
The first element sets out the culpable conduct of the crime of 
aggression. As a material element that concerns conduct, the culpable 
mental state is intention: “[t]hose who open books and sit down in easy 
chairs generally intend to read. . . . Certain acts require and entail having 
certain mental functions.”37 The defendant must mean to (in other words, 
have the purpose to) plan, prepare, initiate, or execute an act of aggression. 
Planning, preparing, initiating, or executing is to the crime of aggression 
what pulling the trigger of a gun is to murder. Both are conduct that results 
in harmful consequences. A suggestion to have separate elements for each 
conduct verb was rejected by the majority of experts at Montreux as being 
unnecessarily complicated.38 The experts also considered the issue of 
causation, or to what degree the defendant’s intentional planning, 
preparation, initiation, or execution must have caused the act of aggression 
in relation to other factors and participants in the act.39 The group 
ultimately noted that the causation issue should be determined by the 
judges hearing a particular case.40 Under this element, the defendant does 
not need to have the specific purpose to commit an act contrary to the UN 
 
 
 36. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21. 
 37. Adam Candeub, Motive Crimes and Other Minds, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 2071, 2101 (1994). 
 38. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 65. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
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Charter. In fact, nowhere in any of the elements or in the definition of 
aggression itself is there a requirement that the perpetrator intend to 
violate the UN Charter.41 Element 4 and the special introduction to the 
elements of the crime of aggression address this subtle and potentially 
problematic issue more directly. 
The second element sets out the leadership requirement. The crime of 
aggression can only be committed by a person “in a position [to 
effectively] exercise control over or to direct the political or military 
action of a State.”42 Followers cannot commit the crime. This is a material 
element that sets out an attendant circumstance that must be present for an 
act to be properly classified as a crime of aggression. Consequently, the 
defendant must know that he or she is a leader of a state, and is in a 
position to effectively exercise control (not merely formally, like a 
figurehead), or to direct the political or military action of a state.43 A 
charismatic religious leader who has effective control over political action 
of a state (e.g., the state bureaucracy follows his edicts) but is not aware of 
the extent of his influence cannot, consequently, commit the crime of 
aggression. He does not have the mens rea required in the second element. 
More than one leader—an entire cabinet, for example—can be liable if 
each individual is aware that he is exercising control, even jointly.44 
The third element is the state or collective act of aggression. The 
individual conduct set out in Element 1 (planning, preparation, initiating 
or executing) causes the state act. The state act is a material element, not a 
mental one. It is not individual conduct. The passive voice in the 
statement, “[t]he act of aggression . . . was committed,” signals that 
Element 3 is not a conduct element.45 The question, which remains 
unresolved, is whether Element 3 is a consequence46 or circumstance 
element.47 In a break with the pattern in the 2002 elements of the crimes, 
the next element, Element 4, sets out the culpable mental state required for 
Element 3. In this way, Element 4 renders moot the question of whether 
Element 3 is a consequence48 or circumstance element. 
 
 
 41. See Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21. 
 42. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (element 2). 
 43. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 67. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 69 (discussing the drafters’ convention of using the active 
voice only for the individual participant, with other sentences in the passive voice). 
 46. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 30(2)(b). 
 47. Id. art. 30(3). 
 48. Id. art. 30(2)(b). 
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What Element 3 does resolve is the question of whether the state act 
needs to be perfected (must have actually occurred) for liability to attach 
to a leader who planned, prepared, initiated, or executed an act of 
aggression. The Montreux group agreed that culpable individual conduct 
committed purposefully will only result in liability if the state act of 
aggression actually occurs.49 There will be no liability for an attempted 
crime of aggression that fails.50 Nonetheless, an armed attack can arguably 
exist at the moment it is launched, when the attack is completed, or 
somewhere in between. This means that the smoking gun in Element 3, in 
the unforgettable words of Condoleezza Rice, does not need to be a 
mushroom cloud.51 
Element 4 is the most intricate, and perhaps also the most impervious, 
of them all. It establishes that the mental state required for the 
state/collective act (Element 3), is knowledge.52 The difficult question is, 
knowledge of what, exactly? That a missile was fired? That it was fired 
across a border? That it was fired across a border without first obtaining a 
Security Council Resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter? Or that 
the Security Council explicitly warned against the use of military force in 
this dispute, and a missile was fired across a border anyway? The 
Montreux group wrestled with how much knowledge to require of a 
perpetrator before Element 3 is satisfied and how to avoid the legal 
problems inherent in a requirement to prove knowledge of law.53 
However, it follows from the criminal law that knowledge of fact, if left 
unchecked, forthwith fades into knowledge of law.54 
Under Element 4, the perpetrator needs to know about the “ factual 
circumstances” that establish that such a use of armed force is 
 
 
 49. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 69. 
 50. Informal inter-sessional meeting of the Special Working Group on the Crime of 
Aggression, Int’l Crim. Ct., at 9–10, paras. 39–50, June 8–11, 2006, Doc. ICC-ASP/5/SWGCA/ 
INF.1 (Sept. 5, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ SWGCA/ICC-ASP-5-
SWGCA-INF1_English.pdf. 
 51. See Top Bush Officials Push Case Against Saddam, CNN (Sept. 8, 2002), http://articles .cnn 
.com/2002-09-08/politics/iraq.debate_1_nuclear-weapons-top-nuclear-scientists-aluminum-tubes?_s= 
PM:ALLPOLITICS (quoting Condoleeza Rice, acknowledging that uncertainty lies in knowing how 
close an opponent is to possessing the capability to launch a nuclear attack, nevertheless advocating a 
preemptive position and stating “[w]e don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.”). 
 52. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 5 (element 4). 
 53. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 71. 
 54. See Clark, supra note 15, at 309–10 (Even in domestic legal systems, “where the lines lie 
between fact and law is often hard to discern. . . . It is no defence to bigamy to claim a belief that 
polygamy is lawful, but there is a defence for the actor who believes that the previous marriage 
had terminated in divorce, even where this involves some mistake as to the laws of divorce.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. The special 
introduction to the Elements narrows the meaning of Element 4 somewhat 
by making it clear that no legal evaluation as to whether the use of armed 
force is inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations is necessary to 
establish knowledge.55 The participants at Montreux were concerned that 
leaders would deliberately avoid requesting legal advice pertaining to the 
use of force or remain willfully blind to it in order to insulate themselves 
from legal accountability.56 In domestic criminal law, willful blindness, 
“cutting off of one’s normal curiosity by effort of the will,” is a standard 
culpable mental state.57 The U.S. experience with the so-called torture 
memos, where political pressure skewed the content of supposedly 
objective legal advice, was also fresh on the participants’ minds.58 
The SWGCA Chairman, in his 2009 Non-paper on the Elements of 
Crimes, trims some more uncertainty at the other end of the knowledge 
spectrum when he writes:  
To satisfy proposed Element 4, it would not be sufficient merely to 
show that the perpetrator knew of facts indicating that the State used 
armed force. It would also be necessary to show that the perpetrator 
knew of facts establishing the inconsistency of the use of force with 
the Charter of the United Nations.59 
The Chairman’s examples of relevant facts that the defendant must know 
about to satisfy Element 4 can be characterized as brackish, or semi-
legal:60 “the fact that the use of force was directed against another State, 
the existence or absence of a Security Council resolution, the content of a 
Security Council resolution, the existence or absence of a prior or 
imminent attack by another state.”61  
 
 
 55. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, Intro., at 21, para. 2. 
 56. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 71; see also 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper on the Elements of 
Crimes, in CRIME OF AGGRESSION LIBRARY: THE TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES OF THE CRIME OF 
AGGRESSION 677, 682, para. 18 (Stefan Barriga & Claus Kreß eds., 2012) (discussing how a 
perpetrator may actively avoid legal advice, as well as rely on disreputable advice about the legality of 
State acts). 
 57. Shawn D. Rodriguez, Caging Careless Birds: Examining Dangers Posed by the Willful 
Blindness Doctrine in the War on Terror, 30 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 691, 718 (2008) (quoting United States 
v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 780 (7th Cir. 2006)).  
 58. Neil A. Lewis, A Guide to the Memos on Torture, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com 
/ref/international/24MEMO-GUIDE.html?_r=0 (last visited Apr. 26, 2013). 
 59. 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 20. 
 60. The same phenomenon of brackish legal-factual knowledge arises in relation to certain war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. See Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 7(1)(d) (elements 2–3), art. 
8(2)(a)(i) (elements 2–3). 
 61. 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 20. 
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The knowledge requirement in Element 4 becomes even subtler when it 
is read in conjunction with Article 32(2) of the Rome Statute, the section 
providing a mistake of law defense.62 Under Article 32(2), a mistake of 
law may be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility if it negates the 
mental element of a crime.63 In his 2001 article on the mental element in 
international criminal law, Roger Clark contributed a helpful rule of 
thumb: the mistake of law defense that “‘works’ is normally a mistake 
about some law which is collateral to the central criminal proscription 
. . . .”
64
 Arguably, a mistake about the existence of a Security Council 
resolution authorizing the use of armed force, at least one that is analogous 
to the bigamist’s mistake of law defense that his prior marriage had been 
legally terminated in divorce, would fit the bill.  
Yet, as the chairman rightly notes in his 2009 Non-paper on the 
Elements of Crimes, requiring knowledge of factual circumstances, as 
Element 4 does, may limit the availability of mistake of law defenses.65 A 
leader who fired a missile in response to an imminent attack, a legal grey 
area in international law, is precluded from claiming mistake of law if 
simple knowledge that his state’s missile was fired across a neighbor’s 
border is enough to establish the culpable mental state for Element 4. As 
Clark points out, limiting the scope of mistake of law defenses in this way 
could possibly be found by the Court to violate the Rome Statute:66 “The 
Court itself has the ultimate word on whether creative elements such as 
these are consistent with the Statute.”67 
Anggadi, French, and Potter seem satisfied that Elements 5 and 6 
resolve the problem of identifying the culpable mental state of the 
perpetrator of the crime of aggression when it comes to the state/collective 
act.68 Element 5 is a material element requiring that the state act of 
aggression, by its character, gravity, and scale, constitute a “manifest” 
violation of the UN Charter.69 Element 6, the mental element that goes 
with Article 5, requires that the perpetrator knows of the factual 
circumstances amounting to a “manifest” violation of the UN Charter.70 
 
 
 62. See Clark, supra note 15, at 308–12, for a revealing commentary on Article 32 of the Rome 
Statute. 
 63. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 32(2). 
 64. Clark, supra note 15, at 310 (quotation marks in original). 
 65. 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 21. 
 66. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 9(3). 
 67. Clark, supra note 17, at 1112. 
 68. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 75–76. 
 69. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (element 5). 
 70. Id. (element 6). 
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Anggadi, French, and Potter’s point is that arguing mistake of law is 
difficult for a defendant to do when he is involved in a manifest violation 
of the UN Charter.71 The complication, however, is that establishing the 
defendant knew that a manifest violation of the UN Charter took place 
seems to require proving that the defendant had some knowledge of the 
law of the Charter, not just factual circumstances—the requirement in 
Elements 4 and 6.72 
The special introduction to the Elements of the Crime of Aggression73 
explains that “manifest” is an objective determination and therefore up to 
the Court to establish by considering what a reasonable leader should 
know.74 The challenge in Montreux was to imagine a scenario where a 
state committed an act of aggression that a leader could reasonably believe 
did not amount to a manifest violation of the UN Charter. The scenario 
envisaged by the participants at Montreux was a leader who planned, and 
therefore had knowledge of, a small-scale border skirmish that got out of 
control and, unbeknownst to him, resulted in a large-scale invasion of a 
neighboring state (a manifest violation of the UN Charter).75 The 
Montreux group acknowledged that the leader in a scenario like this, 
arguably, should not be subject to criminal liability.76 If the Court finds 
that a reasonable leader would not have known that the act of aggression 
would be a manifest violation of the UN Charter, he would be absolved of 
individual criminal responsibility for the crime of aggression.77 A more 
troubling scenario will arise when a leader deploys armed force in what 
she, in good faith, thinks is self-defense or justified humanitarian 
intervention, and the Court finds that it is, objectively, a manifest violation 
of the UN Charter. Though ignorance of the law is never an excuse in 
domestic criminal law regimes, an “honest and reasonable” mistake often 
is.78 Under the elements, the Court will be expected, on a case-by-case 
basis, to distinguish between objectively reasonable defensive or 
humanitarian actions and manifestly illegal ones. 
 
 
 71. See Anggadi et al., supra note 19. 
 72. The special introduction to the elements explains, “[t]here is no requirement to prove that the 
perpetrator has made a legal evaluation as to the ‘manifest’ nature of the violation of the Charter of the 
United Nations,” but it is hard to imagine how the defendant can know that the state act is a manifest 
violation without some knowledge of the law of the Charter. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex 
II, Special Introduction, at 21, para 4. 
 73. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, Special Introduction, at 21, para. 3. 
 74. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, Special Introduction, at 21, para. 3–4. 
 75. Anggadi et al., supra note 19, at 76. 
 76. Id. 
 77. State responsibility for a violation of the UN Charter may still exist as a possible recourse. 
 78. See Clark, supra note 15, at 308–09. 
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In most legal systems in the world, a court in a criminal case can 
impute knowledge.79 Absent honest disclosure, it is simply not possible to 
get at the internal mental state of a defendant without inferring it from 
external cues. The statement of this principle in Illinois criminal law, for 
example, is found in the case of People v. Conley: “[i]ntent can be inferred 
from the surrounding circumstances.”80 The ordinary presumption, writes 
Professor Joshua Dressler in his discussion of Conley, “is that a person 
‘intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.’”81 Words, 
actions, the minutes of meetings attended, the armaments used in an 
attack, and other factors that shed light on the mental state of the defendant 
as he commits the material elements of the crime are all relevant. It 
follows that knowledge, as required in Elements 2, 4, and 6 of the crime of 
aggression, will be inferred from surrounding circumstances as well. 
III. MENS REA DEFENSES 
Mens rea is an important, even central, consideration when judging 
whether a defendant has satisfied all of the elements of the crime of 
aggression. There are different ways that mens rea can come into play in 
an aggression case. When the defendant successfully demonstrates that the 
prosecution has not satisfied one or more of the elements of the crime, it 
can be said that the defendant has mounted a successful “failure of proof” 
defense.82 It is a failure of proof defense to show, for example, that a 
leader-defendant was not aware of the factual circumstances that 
establish that the use of armed force by his military was inconsistent with 
the Charter of the United Nations. In such a case, Element 4 is not proven. 
The exculpatory defenses of justification and excuse may also arise in 
aggression cases.83 Justification and excuse defenses can succeed even 
when the prosecution establishes all of the elements of the crime.84 There 
is a rich literature that tries to capture the essence of these defenses and 
 
 
 79. See generally Shane Darcy, Imputed Criminal Liability and the Goals of International 
Justice, 20 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 377, 380 (2007). 
 80. People v. Conley, 543 N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
 81. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 156 (5th ed. 2009). 
 82. Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 
203–05 (1982). 
 83. See Clark, supra note 15, at 318–19. 
 84. See, e.g., id.; Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts 
and the Literature, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1171 (1987); JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING 
CRIMINAL LAW 207 (6th ed. 2012) (“[t]oday, justified and excused actors are . . . acquitted of the 
offense and neither is punished for her conduct”); Transcript of Judge’s Order, People v. Lagrou, No. 
85-000098 (Mich. Dist. Ct. Mar. 22, 1985). 
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their distinguishing features.85 According to Joshua Dressler, “[i]n its 
simplest form . . . justified conduct is conduct that is ‘a good thing, or the 
right or sensible thing, or a permissible thing to do.’”86 The defendant 
causes a legally recognized harm but, as Paul Robinson explains, “that 
harm is outweighed by the need to avoid an even greater harm or to further 
a greater societal interest.”87 “Whereas a justification negates the social 
harm of an offense,” writes Dressler, “an excuse negates the moral 
blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.”88 Robinson posits that 
the deed may be wrong, but the actor is not responsible for his deed and 
should therefore be excused.89  
A number of defenses are contained in Part 3 of the Rome Statute, the 
general section applicable to all ICC crimes. The excuses of insanity,90 
intoxication,91 duress,92 and superior orders (narrowly conceived)93 are all 
specifically set out in Part 3. Mistake of fact and law, which usually 
qualify as failure of proof defenses that vitiate the mens rea element of the 
crime, are also included.94 Self-defense and defense of others, familiar 
justification defenses in most criminal law jurisdictions, make an 
appearance in Part 3 of the Rome Statute as well.95 Perhaps most 
significantly, the Court may consider other grounds for excluding criminal 
responsibility that are not explicitly included in the Rome Statute.96 It is 
either here, in Article 31(3), and/or in Article 22 on nullum crimen sine 
lege97 that Michael Glennon’s legality challenge may one day be leveled.98 
Not all of these are mens rea defenses. Most excuses vitiate the actus 
reus of the crime.99 Bentham’s view is that excuses exclude punishment 
for “conduct [that] is nondeterrable,” lest the law cause “unnecessary 
 
 
 85. See Dressler, supra note 84, at 1155. 
 86. Id. at 1161. 
 87. Robinson, supra note 82, at 213. 
 88. Dressler, supra note 84, at 1163. 
 89. Robinson, supra note 82, at 221. 
 90. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(a). 
 91. Id. art. 31(1)(b). 
 92. Id. art. 31(1)(d). 
 93. Id. art. 33. 
 94. Id. art. 32. 
 95. Id. art. 31(1)(c). 
 96. Id. art. 31(3). 
 97. “No crime without law.” This principle, like the principle of legality or nonretroactivity, 
stands for the idea that an individual can only be held responsible for acts that were illegal at the time 
of their commission. See, e.g., Rehan Abeyratne, Superior Responsibility and the Principle of Legality 
at the ECCC, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 39, 41 (2012). 
 98. See Michael Glennon, The Blank Prose Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71 (2010). 
 99. They vitiate both the actus reus and the mens rea. 
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evil.”100 According to H.L.A. Hart, excuses limit liability to people who 
have freely chosen to act.101 Under either theoretical explanation, people 
who commit crimes—including the crime of aggression—while not in 
their right mind, can raise an exculpatory excuse defense. Insanity,102 
intoxication,103 superior orders,104 and duress that impedes free choice, 
unlike situations involving a choice of evils, all overcome the will. 
Consequently, crimes committed in this state cannot be deterred.105 These 
defenses are, consequently, outside the scope of this mens rea discussion.  
Self-defense,106 defense of others,107 and duress that involves a choice 
of evils (rather than duress impeding free choice)108 are all justification 
defenses that may one day be raised in an aggression case. Dressler 
explains, “[a] justified act is one that ‘the law does not condemn, or even 
welcomes.’”109 Paul Robinson states, “[a]ll justification defenses have the 
same internal structure: triggering conditions permit a necessary and 
proportional response.”110 Justification defenses pertain specifically to 
mens rea because, unlike most excuse defenses, the defendant has made a 
meaningful choice. In the context of an aggression case, self-defense and 
defense of others are relevant in two of the most important grey-area 
scenarios: anticipatory self-defense in response to an imminent attack and 
humanitarian intervention. 
Article 31(1)(c) of the Rome Statute, on self-defense and the defense of 
others, is reproduced here in relevant part:111 
 
 
 100. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 
160–62 (J. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1970), quoted in Sanford Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. 
REV. 257, 263 (1987). 
 101. H. L. A. Hart, Legal Responsibility and Excuses, in PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: 
ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 46–49 (2008). 
 102. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(a). 
 103. Id. art. 31(1)(b) (“unless the person has become voluntarily intoxicated under such 
circumstances that the person knew, or disregarded the risk, that, as a result of the intoxication, he or 
she was likely to engage in conduct constituting a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court”). 
 104. Id. art. 33; Clark, supra note 17, at 1110 (calls Article 33 of the Rome Statute “a very badly 
drafted provision which permits a defence of superior orders in some cases, perhaps only in the case of 
war crimes.”). Clark refers to Otto Triffterer, Article 33, Superior Orders and Prescription of Law, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT—OBSERVERS’ 
NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 915 (2d ed. 2008). 
 105. It should, however, be noted that behavior that placed the defendant in the mentally or 
morally compromised situation (i.e., voluntarily induced intoxication) can sometimes be deterred. 
 106. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(c). 
 107. Id. art. 31(1)(c). 
 108. Id. art. 31(1)(d). 
 109. DRESSLER, supra note 84, at 208. 
 110. Robinson, supra note 82, at 216 (emphasis in original). 
 111. This excludes the language that is specific to war crimes. 
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The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or another 
person . . . against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a 
manner proportionate to the degree of danger to the person. . . . The 
fact that the person was involved in a defensive operation conducted 
by forces shall not in itself constitute a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility under this subparagraph . . . .112 
This provision raises a number of legal questions that concern the 
minimum triggering conditions to activate the defense, the imminence of 
the threat (the necessity criterion), the unlawfulness of the threat, and the 
proportionality of the defensive response. The key mens rea question 
involved, however, pertains to the reasonableness requirement113 and how 
far the Court should go in taking the defendant’s specific predicament and 
characteristics into account in its judgment. In other words, is the 
“reasonable person” a purely objective or a mixed standard in Article 
31(1)(c)? 
In the U.S. case of State v. Leidholm, for example, the court announced 
this mixed reasonableness standard when evaluating a self-defense claim: 
“an accused’s actions are to be viewed from the standpoint of a 
[reasonable] person whose mental and physical characteristics are like the 
accused’s and who sees what the accused sees and knows what the 
accused knows.”114 This mixed reasonableness standard can be contrasted 
with a purely objective standard that evaluates the defendant’s mental state 
against the ideal of the reasonable person, remaining deliberately blind to 
context, the knowledge possessed by the defendant, and his personal 
characteristics.115 The Leidholm standard can also be contrasted with a 
subjective standard that takes the defendant’s actual context, knowledge, 
and personal characteristics into account when determining the 
applicability of Article 31(1)(c) defenses. 
There has been a tendency in the criminal law, at least when it comes 
to women who kill their abusive husbands, to move toward an increasingly 
subjective-looking mixed standard in self-defense claims.116 The Canadian 
 
 
 112. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(c). 
 113. Presumably an honesty requirement will be read into Article 31(1)(c). For self-defense to 
succeed in national jurisdictions, the defendant must have acted in an “honest and reasonable” belief 
that the threat was imminent. See Clark, supra note 15, at 308–09 (discussing the inclusion of an 
honesty and reasonableness of mistake requirement in the ICC negotiations). 
 114. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 818 (N.D. Sup. Ct. 1983). 
 115. Id. at 816–17. 
 116. See, e.g., R v. Lavallee, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 852 (Can.); People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 6–10 
(Cal. Sup. Ct. 1996) (holding that evidence of battered woman’s syndrome is relevant to the 
reasonableness and subjective existence of a battered woman’s need to defend herself against her 
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case of R. v. Lavallee is representative.117 Lavallee shot her abusive 
partner in the back of the head as he walked away and claimed that she 
feared for her life and saw no other alternative. Even though the threat did 
not meet the traditional imminence threshold, Lavallee was acquitted 
because, for a person suffering from battered woman’s syndrome, it was 
reasonable, in light of the pattern of interactions between her and the 
deceased, to perceive the threat as imminent and to see no other escape. 
The idea gained some traction in the international law literature and 
culminated in a discussion of “battered nation syndrome.”118 In spite of the 
indelicate catchphrase title, this idea is likely to have an influence on the 
interpretation of the Kampala Outcome if and when the perception of 
imminence becomes a legal issue. It remains to be seen whether the Court 
hearing an aggression case will adopt an objective or a mixed standard 
when faced with a self-defense or defense of others claim. 
Like self-defense and defense of others, duress becomes a mens rea 
issue when the defendant claiming it has deliberately chosen to cause the 
prohibited social harm.119 When distinguishing self-defense and defense of 
others (Article 31(1)(c) defenses) from duress (an Article 31(1)(d) 
defense), one might imagine that a villain is holding a gun to the head of 
the leader or his child and threatening to shoot unless that leader gives the 
order to launch a missile at another state. Like self-defense and defense of 
others, duress can only succeed as a defense if the threat is imminent.120 
Presumably, the question of the appropriate reasonableness standard, 
objective, or mixed that arises in 31(1)(c) will also surface in duress cases. 
The threat should not have to be caused by another person. Many domestic 
jurisdictions extend the defense to situations of necessity, where a threat is 
caused by natural, rather than man-made, circumstances. A leader who 
orders an invasion of another state to rescue his citizens from a 
culminating tsunami that only his oceanographers are aware of should be 
able to raise a defense. 
 
 
abusive husband); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 10–13 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992) (applying Oklahoma’s 
“hybrid” subjective and objective standard in a battered woman syndrome murder prosecution). 
 117. See generally Lavallee, 1 S.C.R. at 852.  
 118. See Michael Skopets, Battered Nation Syndrome: Relaxing the Imminence Requirement of 
Self-Defense in International Law, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 753 (2006); Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 215–16 (2004); Shana 
Wallace, Comment, Beyond Imminence: Evolving International Law and Battered Women’s Right to 
Self-Defense, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1749, 1751 (2004). 
 119. Duress is an actus reus issue when it vitiates the will and the defendant acts automatically, 
because such a defendant lacks the volition to act. See, e.g., State v. Utter, 479 P.2d 946, 947–48 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1971).  
 120. DRESSLER, supra note 84, at 298. 
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An important mens rea criterion that the Court faced with a duress 
defense will need to consider, one that does not arise in self-defense and 
defense of other cases, is whether the defendant “intend[ed] to cause a 
greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.”121 The proportionality 
criteria in self-defense and defense of other cases is similar, but not 
exactly the same. In duress cases, for example, the prosecution will need 
to prove that the defendant intended to cause a greater harm and, therefore, 
knew that it was a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided.122 
Presumably the duress defense would have failed in the 2006 case of Gilad 
Shalit, the Israeli soldier captured by Hamas, who Israel launched a large-
scale armed conflict, in part, to free.123 The duress defense might have 
succeeded, however, following the 1986 Entebbe Airport raid, conducted 
by Israel to free over one hundred Israeli and Jewish passengers from a 
hijacked Air France plane when Ugandan leader Idi Amin refused to 
act.124 In the Entebbe raid, the harm caused—a geographically narrow and 
time-limited invasion and the deaths of the hijackers—was calculated to 
be less than the one sought to be avoided, the death of many passengers. 
This is unlike the return of Gilad Shalit, which involved large-scale armed 
conflict, was not geographically narrow or time limited, and advanced 
other strategic goals beyond the eventual return of Shalit.125 
According to Roger Clark, “[i]t is, for example, here [Article 31(1)(d)] 
that arguments about the legality of humanitarian intervention may need to 
be structured.”126 The leader caused the social harm—the invasion of 
another state—but it was necessary to prevent a larger harm: a large-scale 
humanitarian disaster. The act of aggression was therefore justified and 
can succeed as a complete exculpatory defense. 
Thomas Franck, in Recourse to Force,127 makes a similar argument that 
humanitarian intervention amounts to necessity but adds a creative 
modification of potential use to the Court in an aggression case.128 Franck 
bases his reasoning on the nineteenth century lifeboat cases of The Queen 
 
 
 121. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 31(1)(d). 
 122. Id. 
 123. See Orly Halpern, What the Gaza War Meant for Israel, ALJAZEERA, http://www.aljazeera 
.com/focus/gazaoneyearon/2010/2010/01/201011392050370701.html (last updated Jan. 19, 2010). 
 124. BBC On This Day: 4 July 1976: Israelis Rescue Entebbe Hostages, BBC, http://news.bbc 
.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/july/4/newsid_2786000/2786967.stm (last visited Dec. 11, 2012). 
 125. See Halpern, supra note 123. 
 126. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1110.  
 127. THOMAS FRANCK, RECOURSE TO FORCE: STATE ACTION AGAINST THREATS AND ARMED 
ATTACKS 174–75 (2002). 
 128. Id. 
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v. Dudley and Stephens129 and United States v. Holmes130 where 
shipwrecked sailors killed and ate one of their crewmembers to survive at 
sea. Article 31(1)(d) is a complete exculpatory defense to aggression and 
the other ICC crimes. Yet, in these lifeboat cases, necessity did not 
succeed as a complete exculpatory defense to murder. As Franck notes, 
circumstances amounting to necessity “effectively mitigated the penalties 
imposed on those whose acts were found to have been illegal but, in the 
extreme circumstances, justifiable.”131 Ignoring for the moment the 
theoretical problem of whether a legitimately justified act can actually be 
illegal,132 Franck’s mitigation of penalties theory amounts to a 
supplementary or alternative defense alongside the exculpatory duress 
defense set out in Article 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute and invoked by 
Roger Clark in the context of humanitarian intervention.133 
An interesting idiosyncrasy of the Kampala amendments is that the 
self-defense and defense of others issues can surface at various stages of 
the proceedings, not only when it comes to mens rea defenses. The 
question of whether a particular state act amounts to aggression, self-
defense, or humanitarian rescue first becomes a central consideration as 
early as the jurisdictional phase.134 The Court addresses the question again 
when considering the substantive crime and, in particular, Element 3, 
concerning the state act. This substantive determination is independent of 
the determination for the purposes of jurisdiction and can even contradict 
it.135  
The questions of self-defense and/or humanitarian rescue will 
conceivably arise again after the Court determines that aggression has 
occurred. Pursuant to Elements 5 and 6, the Court must then evaluate 
whether the act of aggression was a “manifest” violation of the UN 
Charter. A particular use of force can, under the Kampala Outcome, be 
illegal without amounting to a manifest violation of the UN Charter. The 
paradigmatic examples are self-defense in response to an imminent attack 
and genuine humanitarian rescue. But not even the substantive 
determination that the state committed a manifest violation of the UN 
 
 
 129. R v. Dudley & Stephens, [1884] 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng.). 
 130. United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Penn. 1842). 
 131. FRANCK, supra note 127, at 179. 
 132. See Dressler, supra note 84, at 1161 (“A justification . . . negates the social harm of an 
offense.”). 
 133. See Clark, supra note 17, at 1110. 
 134. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, at 19–20, arts. 15 bis, 15 ter. 
 135. Id. at 19, art. 15 bis, para. 9 (“A determination of an act of aggression by an organ outside the 
Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this Statute.”). 
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Charter puts the issue to rest. As discussed earlier, self-defense and 
defense of others are also exculpatory defenses for a leader in the dock. A 
judge hearing an aggression case, especially one adopting a mixed 
reasonableness standard as discussed above, could find that the state 
committed a manifest violation of the UN Charter, but the defendant-
leader who ordered the attack honestly and reasonably believed he was 
acting in self-defense or to defend others (his people). Finally, a Court that 
adopts Thomas Franck’s mitigation of penalties theory might decide to 
consider self-defense or defense of others issues at sentencing. Given this 
range of options for the defense, a defense lawyer who is unable to figure 
out where to fit his self-defense or humanitarian intervention argument 
should get stronger spectacles. 
Roger Clark thinks that it is extremely unlikely that the final 
enumerated defense, the defense of superior orders contained in Article 33 
of the Rome Statute, will ever work in an aggression case.136 Clark’s 
reasoning is that aggression is a leadership crime and is, by definition, 
inapplicable to followers.137 Certainly, it is difficult, though probably not 
impossible, to imagine a situation where all three requirements of the 
superior orders defense are met for a leader. For the defense to succeed, 
the leader-defendant must fulfill the following criteria: be under a legal 
obligation to obey the orders of his Government; not know that the order 
was unlawful; and the order cannot be manifestly unlawful.138 Even if it is 
possible to imagine a scenario where a leader with sufficient authority to 
satisfy Element 2 follows an order (I think it is, particularly in a 
democracy), the requirement that there be no manifest unlawfulness 
essentially guarantees that the leader will be acquitted on other grounds 
(see the preceding paragraph) before the defendant has a chance to raise 
the superior orders defense. The crime of aggression, recall, requires a 
manifest violation of the UN Charter. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, the most important mens rea question will be whether, 
taken as a whole, the mental element satisfies our notions of culpability for 
the wrong. Is the phenomenon defined in 2010 as the crime of aggression, 
when scrutinized, sufficiently blameworthy to warrant serious stigma and 
punishment?  
 
 
 136. Clark, supra note 17, at 1110. 
 137. Id.; Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (element 2). 
 138. Rome Statute, supra note 22, art. 33(1)(a-c). 
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A number of zones within the mens rea structure of the crime of 
aggression may pose a challenge to traditional notions of culpability. The 
fact that a leader need not mean (have the purpose) to commit a state act of 
aggression (knowledge will suffice)139 may trouble some who are 
accustomed to criminal law systems which require intent of criminal 
conduct before punishment will be imposed. The “knowledge of factual 
circumstances” gloss in Elements 4 and 6 also challenges contemporary 
notions of culpability in certain scenarios.140 A leader who has knowledge 
of a military operation but does not intend to violate the UN Charter can 
still be punished under some circumstances.141 This creative mens rea 
standard is especially troubling in grey-area scenarios where the exact 
contours of international law on the use of force are in dispute. Three 
important examples are self-defense in response to an imminent attack, 
humanitarian rescue, and cyber-attacks.142 The fact that grey area scenarios 
are excluded under the “manifest violation” qualifier offers some comfort. 
However, “manifest violation” is an objective standard—a rarity in 
domestic criminal law systems where incarceration or other serious 
punishment is involved. If knowledge that a missile was fired across a 
border is enough to satisfy Elements 4 and 6, a Court can simply reject a 
leader’s honest belief that his state’s acts were defensive or humanitarian, 
whatever proof he may offer. Furthermore, the “knowledge of factual 
circumstances” gloss may preclude a mistake of law defense, offending 
some criminal lawyers.143 
None of this necessarily crosses the line, even if some aspects of the 
mens rea of the crime of aggression may push against it. Perhaps some 
challenges to traditional criminal law doctrines are inevitable when 
conceptualizing a new crime that attributes individual responsibility for a 
large-scale collective act such as aggression. Certainly, the judges are 
being asked to chart a new course. It will be up to them, hearing concrete 
aggression cases and reasoning from existing jurisprudence, to keep the 
mens rea elements within the bounds of contemporary criminal law and to 
ensure that the fledgling crime accords with evolving notions of 
culpability. 
 
 
 139. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (elements 3–4). 
 140. However, the fact that the “knowledge of factual circumstances” gloss exists in other parts of 
the Rome Statute in relation to other crimes buttresses the use of this language somewhat. 
 141. Kampala Outcome, supra note 1, Annex II, at 21 (elements 4, 6). 
 142. Noah Weisbord, Judging Aggression, 50 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 82, 149–67 (2011). 
 143. This is so unless the Court accepts the SWGCA Chairman’s interpretation of “knowledge of 
factual circumstances.” 2009 Chairman’s Non-Paper, supra note 56, at 683, para. 20. 
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